Criminal responsibility without alternative possibilities? The dilemma of freedom and the structure of ascription

Autores/as

  • Bruno de Oliveira Moura Universidade Lusófona de Lisboa

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.60543/dlb.vi2.7878

Palabras clave:

criminal responsibility, free will, indeterminism, determinism, compatibilism, freedom of action, Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), Source Model (SM), causing the conditions of one’s own lack of liability, extraordinary imputation

Resumen

This essay is about some connections between the idea according to which free will and determinism are mutually compatible and the fundamentals of criminal imputation. It is sustained that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities remains indispensable as a starting point, without damage to its integration into a broader model, able to cover those situations where the moral agent intentionally (at least by negligence) produces (or do not avoid) the conditions of his own lack of liability in ordinary or general terms.

Descargas

Publicado

2022-01-31

Número

Núm. 2 (2021): De Legibus - Revista de Direito

Sección

Artigos

Licencia


Assegura-se aos potenciais leitores o acesso livre e gratuito do conteúdo editorial, estando autorizada a sua reprodução total ou parcial, conforme a licença CC BY 4.0 (Creative Commons Atribuição 4.0 Internacional)

Cómo citar

«Criminal responsibility without alternative possibilities? The dilemma of freedom and the structure of ascription ». 2022. De Legibus - Revista de Direito da Universidade Lusófona Lisboa, n.º 2 (enero): 24. https://doi.org/10.60543/dlb.vi2.7878.